A series of recently released legal guidelines on Open Source Intelligence explain how and when intelligence agencies can exploit social media and other online resources. One of the documents, previously classified SECRET//NOFORN, hints at the online recruitment of people as sources of information. Collectively, the guidelines spell out the restrictions intelligence agencies work with when dealing with OSINT, revealing how users and developers can deter intelligence agencies from some of the most casual, and pervasive, forms of surveillance.

With the holidays upon us, requesters everywhere are making a list of the documents they hope to find in their stocking this year. But not everyone is in the mood for transparency cheer, with allegations that some top officials are pulling a Grinch when it comes to handing out the documents the public is owed.

Tom Secker and Matthew Alford spent years digging into a secret that was hiding in plain sight. Or rather, hiding in movie theaters, television sets, and streaming services everywhere: The secret influence the Department of Defense and intelligence community had on Hollywood. In this Requester’s Voice, Secker shares what he learned.

Back in March, Emma Best requested copies of “written requests for investigations or reports relating to Donald J. Trump or his campaign” from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Just this week, the ODNI responded, saying that after a “comprehensive search,” it couldn’t find any. Which is strange, because as a simple Google search found responsive records.

As a result of the failure by the Senate Intelligence Committee to restore the GAO’s authority to audit or review the Central Intelligence Agency, by the next year that immunity had spread to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which had assumed some of the Agency’s responsibilities in coordinating the Intelligence Community. Like CIA, the ODNI cited a legally dubious position in a 1988 letter from the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel stating that the GAO had no authority to look at anything relating to “intelligence activities.” Also like CIA, the ODNI used a such a broad definition of intelligence activities so that “by definition” they were categorically exempt.

While the 25-year declassification review program hasn’t reached the new millennium yet, contemporary public records still provide some insight into the GAO’s efforts to audit the Intelligence Community in general and Central Intelligence Agency in particular. After its creation and taking on some of the duties that had previously laid with CIA, the ODNI would pay lip service to the GAO and seem to cooperate on some issues. At the same time, it manifested the same problems, ignoring its own guidance and, like the Agency, claim that almost anything was protected as an intelligence source or method.

In 2013, the National Security Agency rejected a request for Edward Snowden’s emails to superiors, as well as his employee reviews. But a year later, after Snowden claimed he emailed his superiors with concerns, the Office of the Director of Intelligence posted one of those emails to its Tumblr.

While General Alexander and the NSA saw their FOIA caseload increase by 1,000% following the Snowden leaks, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper barely saw any uptick in requests at all. But ODNI is still tracking all FOIAs related to the leaks.

In August, the Associated Press asked the Office of the Director of National Intelligence whether it had issued instructions to monitor or detain journalists Glenn Greenwald, Barton Gellman and Laura Poitras and their associates David Miranda and Edward Snowden. While ODNI claims not to have any guidance documents on tracking these individuals, processing notes from the request indicate that its FOIA office is keeping tabs on requests related to the Snowden leaks.